



Fukushima consequence:  
EU stress tests – targeted  
reassessment of NPP's

an NGO viewpoint

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# IMPACTS OF FUKUSHIMA IN EU 1/2

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WEST and EAST EU

... about causes and impacts

- West: high level information stream in media
- East and Italy: low intensity and low quality information stream in media

STILL: everywhere increase in opposition to nuclear

– even in countries like FR and CZ!

(source: e.g. IPSOS, 20 June 2011)

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# IMPACTS OF FUKUSHIMA IN EU 2/2

## POLITICAL IMPACTS

- decreased trust in control over the technology
- decreased trust in whether the system is willing and capable to answer fundamental qualitative questions
- loss of trust in data
- decrease in trust of independence of regulatory system (incl. IAEA)

(less in Central Europe, but some trickle through... CZ, BG, PL)

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# PERCEPTION REGULATORS

Traditionally cosy relationships between regulators and industry  
("data dependency", revolving doors)

Directive 71/2009/EURATOM:

- CNS 8(2) set into binding art. 5(2)

→ slowly increasing *de facto* independence

- examples: DE, FR, SI... UK? HU?

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# STRESS TESTS – fears 1/4

NGOs fear greenwash in some or even many countries  
- flagged already in all EU countries with NPPs except for DE

## LOOPHOLES

1. compartmentalisation of the stress tests  
("regulatory mandate", off-site emergency response, security issues) → questions about the interaction regulator / operator / out-of-fence emergency authorities / population
2. lack of integration of security and safety issues,  
incl. combined issues

# STRESS TESTS – fears 2/4

## LOOPHOLES

### 3. independence...

1st phase by operator is a very basic conflict of interests and threatens credibility → how do regulators want to guarantee that all questions come on the table and are investigated?

# STRESS TESTS – fears 3/4

## LOOPHOLES

### 4. "closed issues"

Issues that have been "closed" by regulators in the past, but about which there are still open questions in the public...

Any guarantee for in-depth analysis when the regulator in the past has been involved in political decisions?

(examples: Temelín - construction faults; Kozloduy, Paks - regulatory system reaction around the 2006 and 2002 incidents)

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# STRESS TESTS – fears 4/4

## LOOPHOLES

### 5. Exclusion of projects

Example: Belene, Bulgaria...

There is no reason not to re-assess seismic, flooding, stability and other siting issues as well as design...

Will have influence on the credibility in the entire EU!

### 7. Consistency - 3<sup>rd</sup> stage EU peer-review enough to prevent differences between countries? Highest level!

Operators and regulators are also only people

→ no place for arrogance...



# STRESS TESTS – fears conclusion

Although we hope that the stress tests will help governments to follow the German or Italian examples...

... we fear a complete melt-down of credibility of the regulatory system if

- reactors like Garoña, Fessenheim, Bugey, Gravelines, Oldbury, Hinkley Point, Hunterston, Wylfa, Doel, Beznau and Muehleberg will remain open
- reactor designs like the VVER 440/213 and CANDU are not fundamentally questioned

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# SUGGESTIONS – 1/2

1. FIRST PHASE carried out by independent consultants hired by the operator + consensus on choice of consultant with the second phase expert group
2. SECOND PHASE: inclusion of independent national experts (incl. those proposed by NGOs) + full access to power stations and archives + round of public participation under Aarhus Convention parameters
3. THIRD PHASE: inclusion of independent international experts + round of public participation under Aarhus Convention parameters

## SUGGESTIONS – 2/2

4. Inclusion of independent national experts in national nuclear security assessments  
(confidentiality - public interest balance)
5. Inclusion of the results from national nuclear security assessments in the peer-review on EU level  
(confidentiality - public interest balance)

Thank you  
for your  
attention



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