

WENRA's involvement in the Ukrainian crisis

Olivier GUPTA, ASN, WENRA's Chair

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

- Several international bodies are involved in the nuclear part of the Ukrainian crisis:
 - IAEA
 - INRA
 - EC
 - ENSREG
 - WENRA
 - HERCA

- Each of them has launched initiatives to support SNRIU:
 - Meetings with SNRIU's participation
 - Letters, statements, position papers
 - Proposals for assistance
 - Diplomatic initiatives

- One key shared objective is to maintain coordination between all bodies to be as efficient as possible in supporting SNRIU.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF PLAYERS OTHER THAN WENRA

- Coordination of support to Ukraine in the nuclear field: such assistance would be coordinated by the IAEA (RANET) at international/global level and by the EC at European level.
- Coordinated emergency response: HERCA has set up a task force to this purpose.
- Political statements : WENRA's field of competence and legitimacy is not political.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL REGULATORS/WENRA

- As independent regulators, WENRA members have the duty to:
 - Inform their governments and the public
 - Advise the competent national authorities in case of accident
 - Provide assistance to SNRIU if needed
- These missions:
 - Need to be coordinated among European regulators → WENRA
 - May require the support of TSOs

WENRA ACTIONS CONDUCTED TO DATE

- Regular interactions with other concerned organisations (SNRIU, the IAEA, the EC services ENSREG, HERCA).
- A technical group, with large membership (WENRA members, TSO, EC services) and clear mandate, was formed:
 - To improve information sharing process
 - To conduct technical analysis and issue common positions
 - To gather technical assessment and share technical information to anticipate and be prepared to face an accident

INFORMATION SHARING

- Why: to have the same basis and level of information.
- How: identification of a contact point for all interested WENRA member.
- Result: distribution on a daily basis of an updated and consolidated information produced by the EC.
- Status: on going /permanent activity.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND COMMON POSITIONS

- Why: to have a common view regarding the status of nuclear safety of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and speak in a coordinated manner.
- How: discussion about available information regarding situations with potentially significant safety consequences.
- Result: 3 common positions published up to now
 - WENRA-HERCA Conclusions on the consequences of a nuclear accident (9th March)
 - WENRA position on the consequences of a total loss of power supply at the Chornobyl site (11th March)
 - WENRA position on the safety situation of ZNPP / partial loss of external power supply (23rd March)
- Status: stand-by activity, depending on the situation.

ANTICIPATION AND PREPARATION TO FACE AN ACCIDENT

- Why:
 - To perform modelling of specific accident scenarios
 - To provide inputs for a coordinated response in case of a nuclear emergency situation that could impact Ukraine and its neighbouring countries

- How: benchmarking on modelling capacities of the technical group organisations.

ANTICIPATION AND PREPARATION TO FACE AN ACCIDENT

- Results:
 - Identification of modelling capabilities of members

Topic	<u>Belgium</u> (SCK- CEN)	<u>Czech</u> <u>Republic</u> (SURO)	<u>Denmark</u> (DEMA)	<u>Finland</u> (STUK)	France (IRSN)	Germany (GRS)	<u>The</u> <u>Netherlands</u> (RIVM)	<u>United</u> <u>Kingdom</u> (ONR)	EC/JRC
Reactor/facilities	N/A	X	N/A	N/A	X	X	X	X	X
Accident scenarios	N/A	X	N/A	N/A	X	X	X	X	X
Source term evaluation	X (reverse)	X	N/A	N/A	X	X	X	X	X
Dispersion modelling	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Through partner organisations	X

This table doesn't take into consideration modelling capabilities of sanitary impacts on population.

- In case of real emergency situation in Ukraine, various set of data provided by SNRIU and other Ukrainian organisations, including operators, would be necessary to conduct accurate calculations, evaluations and prognosis

ANTICIPATION AND PREPARATION TO FACE AN ACCIDENT

- Status: on-going, with a follow-up meeting to :
 - Confirm mutual understanding and knowledge of tools, hypothesis, limits, codes... used by the different organisations to perform their modelling.
 - Discuss a path forward regarding an information sharing process of modelling in case of a real emergency situation in Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

- National regulators have been able to react quickly and collectively
 - Facilitated by the existing structures and good personal relations
 - Good coordination between WENRA, HERCA, ENSREG and the EC, and also with the IAEA
- This has been done on a voluntary basis, in line with the national responsibilities that we have as regulatory bodies
- This has highlighted that work still needs to be done to further coordinate our actions and recommendations in case of nuclear accident
 - Coordinated emergency response (HERCA)
 - Further work on modelling tools (WENRA ad-hoc WG)
 - Real time connection between emergency response centers ?

Thank you